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OHIO'S NEED TO ENACT A LIVING WILL STATUTE AND
RECOGNIZE THE TERMINALLY ILL PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
DEATH WITH DIGNITY
INTRODUCTION
Without natural death, human societies and the human race itself would
certainly be unable to thrive. Perhaps when we realize this we may come
to realize at the same time that there is a point in the degeneration of our
bodies when life loses its value, and we may then be prepared voluntarily
to leave the scene to our successors.'
Advancing and upholding the "sanctity or preservation of life is a para-
rnount state interest."2 The common law regards life as "sacred and unalien-
ible" and prohibits anyone from committing suicide or "licensing his own de-
;truction."3 Today's advanced medical technology, which enables an individu-
il's life to be prolonged for an indefinite period of time,4 is mandating a reanal-
isis of the meaning of "sanctity of life." 5 Technology can "ventilate a corpse or
,rolong death when life as we know it has long passed."6 Society is now forced
o acknowledge and address the issues created by technological advancements.
A terminally ill patient may decide to forego or terminate life-sustaining
nedical treatment and allow the "natural processes of death" to occur.7 This
aramount decision has been variously referred to as the right to die, death
vith dignity, and passive euthanasia.' Several moral, medical, and legal issues
re intertwined in recognizing and permitting the terminally ill patient to make
his decision.
Society must determine the circumstances in which a terminally ill patient
;ill be permitted to terminate life-sustaining treatment. If a terminally ill pa-
ient is incompetent, for example, the question arises as to who can make this
Villiams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 178 (1966); see also, Kutner, Due Process of
uthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kutner].
;uperintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
'larke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technology and Medical
onsensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 815 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Clarke]; Comment, Euthanasia:
riminal Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202 (1973).
'larke, supra note 3, at 815; see also, Dufraine, Living Wills - A Need For Statewide Legislation or a
tderally Recognized Right, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 781 (hereinafter cited as Dufrainel. The technological
:vices include respirators, heart lung machines, pacemakers, antibiotics, defibrillators, chronic dialysis,
1pothermia, artificial or transplanted organs, and extensive drug therapy. Comment, The Living Will:
'ready a Practical Alternative, 55 TEx. L. REV. 665, 666 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Living Will].
ellegie, Medical Technology as it Exists Today, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 31 (1975).
iving Will, supra note 4, at 666.
ichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 539 (App. Div. 1980), modified, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
0 N.E.2d 64, 348 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
3TATE PLANNING STUDIES, A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH (October 1985) (Available from National City
nk, Trust Division).
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decision on behalf of the patient.' In response to this uncertainty, many states
have enacted legislation establishing procedures and guidelines for the medical
profession, legal profession and the terminally ill patient when confronted with
this life and death decision. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia
have enacted Natural Death and "Living Will" statutes.1"
A "living will" is a document which constitutes an affirmative directive to
medical personnel to withhold life-sustaining medical treatment in certain in-
stances." The "living will" statutes permit a terminally ill patient to refuse life-
sustaining treatment in the event such treatment will have no "restorative" ef-
fect. 2 Terminally ill patients are given the assurance that their decision con-
cerning life-sustaining treatment will be effectuated without the need of ju-
dicial intervention. The Ohio Legislature is considering a "living will" or
natural death act, 3 but as yet no such legislation has been enacted.
This article discusses the use of "living wills" as a method for permitting a
terminally ill patient to forego or terminate life-sustaining treatment. First, the
constitutional issues, description, and medical and legal considerations of "liv-
ing wills" will be explored. Secondly, alternative methods to forego or termi-
nate life-sustaining treatment will be discussed. Finally, this article will analyze
Ohio's proposed "living will" statute, and offer corresponding recommenda-
tions.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The right to accept or refuse medical treatment is predicated on common
law principles. This right protects one's interests both in the "integrity of his
'Landerfeld & Tatham, The "Living Will," The Durable Power of Attorney and the Right to Terminate
Medical Treatment, 56 CLEv. B.J. 8 (1984) (hereinafter cited as Right to Terminate].
"ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-199 to 208 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
82-3801 to 3804 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15-18-101 to I l l (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 85-606 to 613 (West Supp. 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 to 2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32- I to-12 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to
-4508 (Supp. 1984); Living Will Act §§ 1-10, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110!2 §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (West. Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A-I to -I (West Supp.
1985); KAN. STAT_ ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 to 109 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West
Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 to 2934 (West 1985); MD. HEALTH-GENERAL CODE ANN.
§§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -205 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
449.540-.690 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1-16 (Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11
(1981 & Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111
(West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11- 101 to -114 (Supp.
1985); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h) (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to 1113
(1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262, (Supp. 1984-1985); VA_ CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1985);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (West Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1985); WYO. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1985).
"Martyn, Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of At-
torney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779, 786 (1984) (hereinafter cited as Martyn].
"Right to Terminate, supra note 9, at 10.
"H.B. 220, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1985).
[Vol. 19:3
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body" and in freedom from "unpermitted physical contact.""' "Each man is
considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind,
expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery or other medical
treatment.""
The right to privacy has been the basis for courts to acknowledge and
uphold a terminally ill patient's right to refuse medical treatment, whether ex-
pressed by a competent adult,16 or in the case of an incompetent, through a
guardian. 7 No constitutional provision explicitly enunciates a "right to
privacy." In Olmstead v. United States," the right to privacy received its first
judical recognition as a possible constitutional right in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Brandeis.' 9 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 2 0 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the right to privacy was included in the "penumbras" of
the Bill of Rights.2' The United States Supreme Court has not yet applied the
constitutionally-protected right to privacy to terminally ill patients.22 However,
state courts have held that the decision of a terminally ill patient to refuse life-
prolonging treatment is protected by the right to privacy.23
Courts balance the right to privacy against the interests of the state. In In
'Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 988 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Medical Treatment]. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, then the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others .. " Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482
A.2d 713 (1984).
"Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
6Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afjd, 379 So. 2d 359 (1980).
'In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Superintendent of Bel-
chertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), the court applied the "substituted judgment
doctrine" in allowing the guardian to refuse treatment on behalf of the ward. Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
See generally, Comment, The Right to Die and Substituted Judgment in Texas, 18 Hous. L. REV. 851 (1981).
"277 U.S. 438 (1928).
"Justice Brandeis stated:
[tihe makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They
knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred as against the Government, the right to be left alone - the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
-381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"Id. at 482-85. For further development of the right to privacy, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713
(1984).
"See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
"See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379
So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629,
405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977);
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. I,
426 N.E.2d 809 (1980). It has been held that it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the ter-
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Re Quinlan,24 the court discussed the state's interest concerning a terminally ill
patient's25 decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment, stating "We think that
the state's interest [in the preservation of lifel weakens and the individual's
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prog-
nosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights
overcome the state interest."2 The recognized state interests include protecting
innocent third parties, preventing suicide, preserving life, and protecting the
ethical integrity of the medical profession." A thorough analysis and discus-
sion of these state interests is beyond the scope of this article.28
A terminally ill patient has the right to forego life-sustaining treatment.
However, a question remains as to whether courts are adequately prepared to
make decisions and set guidelines concerning a terminally ill patient's desire to
terminate life-sustaining treatment. There is widespread recognition that the
judicial setting is not the proper forum for making treatment decisions. 9 Re-
sorting to the courts to confirm the patient's decision to forego life-sustaining
treatment is inappropriate, not only because it is an "encroachment upon the
medical profession's field of competence, but because it would be impossibly
cumbersome."30
2-70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
2 Miss Quinlan, in addition to being comatose, was in a "chronic and persistent vegetative state," having no
awareness of anything or anyone around her and existing at a "primitive reflex level." Id. at 19, 355 A.2d at
655.
261d. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
27Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 738, 737, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977). In addressing the state's interest in the preser-
vation of life and the right of privacy, the court in Saikewicz states:
lilt is clear that the most significant of the asserted State interest is that of the preservation of human
life .... The interest of the State in prolonging a life must be reconciled with the interest of an in-
dividual to reject the traumatic cost of that prolongation. There is a substantial distinction in the
State's insistence that human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State in-
terest where, as here, the issue is not whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the in-
dividual that life may be briefly extended.... We believe it is not inconsistent to recognize a right to
decline medical treatment in a situation of incurable illness.
Id. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 425. In Saunders v. State, - Misc. 2d -, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1985), the court held
that it is certainly not against public policy to permit a terminally ill patient to choose not to delay the in-
evitable and imminent termination of his or her life. Id. at 514.
"For a thorough discussion of the state's interest, see comment, A Proposed Amendment to the California
Natural Death Act to Assure the Statutory Right to Control Life Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 17
U.S.F.L. REV. 579 (1983).
9Medical Treatment, supra note 14, at 995; see also ROSOFF, LIVING WILLS AND NATURAL DEATH AcTs.
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS, 186-89 (1982)
(judicial proceedings are "no way to make life or death decisions") [hereinafter cited as ROSOFF). Contra,
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977). (Courts are uniquely qualified to make deter-
minations which require "detached but passionate investigation").
"In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 50, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (1976). In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
involved an eighty-four year old patient who was mentally incompetent and terminally ill. The case
presented the issue of whether a feeding tube could be removed from the patient. In discussing the ap-
propriateness of judicial resolution of the issue, the court stated:
Perhaps it would be best if the legislature formulated clear standards for resolving requests to ter-
minate life-sustaining treatment for incompetent patients. As an elected body, the legislature is better
able than any other single institution to reflect the social values at stake. In addition, it has the
resources and ability to synthesize vast quantities of data and opinions from a variety of fields and to
[Vol. 19:3
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Legislation is the answer to the many issues created by the terminally ill
patient's choice to forego life-sustaining treatment. Courts are simply not ade-
quately prepared to handle the issues involving such far-reaching "political,
moral and ethical dimensions."'" Legislation is the most appropriate way to
resolve the difficult issues in society, since the legislative process allows input
from all segments of the society."
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
Luis Kutner is credited with having developed the concept of the "living
will."33 He described the reason why a "living will" is essential:
The law provides that a patient may not be subjected to treatment
without his consent. But when he is in a condition in which his consent
cannot be expressed, the physician must assume that the patient wishes to
be treated to preserve his life. His failure to act fully to keep the patient
alive in a particular instance may lead to liability for negligence. But it
may well be that a patient does not desire to be kept in a state of indefinite
vegetated animation. How then can the individual patient retain the right
of privacy over his body - the right to determine whether he should be
permitted to die, to permit his body to be given to the undertaker?3"
Living wills have been referred to by many names. 5 The "living will" has
been defined as "a directive to [one's] family and physician acknowledging
[one's] preference for a dignified death as opposed to an artificial or mechanical
prolongation of life when no reasonable hope of recovery remains.36 It must be
pointed out that a "living will" may not authorize the commission of
euthanasia. 7 Living wills are analagous to a revocable or conditional trust.38
I formulate general guidelines that may be applicable to a broad range of situations.
Id. at 344, 355 A.2d at 1220-21 (footnote omitted).
"Freamon, Death With Dignity Laws: A Plea For Uniform Legislation, 5 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 105, 119
(1982).
321d.
"Kutner, supra note 1.
-'Id. at 550.
"Comment, The Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 TEX. TECH L. REV. 99 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Right to Die].
"Comment, Living Will - Death With Dignity or Mechanical Vitality, 10 CuM. L. REV. 163, 164 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Death With Dignity]; See Note, The "Living Will" The Right to Die With Dignity?, 26
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 485 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note]; Note, The "Living Will" - An Individual's Ex-
ercise of His Rights of Privacy and Self Determination, 7 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 714 (1976).
"Kutner, supra note 1, at 553. "While a patient may determine the type of medical treatment he may
receive, he may not use the living will as a means for directing a doctor or another individual to act affir-
matively to terminate his life. A living will authorizing mercy killing is contrary to public policy." Id.
Euthanasia has been defined as the taking of positive action to end the life of an incurable patient. S.
SHINDELL, THE LAW IN MEDICAL PRACrICE 118 (1966). Euthanasia must be distinguished from an-
tidysthanasia which has been defined as the "failure to take positive action to prolong the life of an incurable
patient with intractable pain." Id.
"Kutner, The Living Will.' Coping With the Historical Event of Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 39, 49 (1975).
Winter, !1986] COMMENTS
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The patient's body is the res, the patient is the beneficiary and grantor, and the
physician and hospital are the trustees. 9 Under a "living will," "the doctor is
given authority to act as the trustee of the patient's body by virtue of the pa-
tient's consent to treatment." °
Legislative enactment
A legislative movement to clarify the status of "living wills" was initiated
by the California Natural Death Act of 1976.' California's "living will" statute
constructed the foundation upon which other states could enact legislation. In
the years immediately following 1976, few states enacted "living will" statutes.
By the end of 1982, only fourteen states granted their citizens the right to ter-
minate life-sustaining treatment.2 A total of twenty states proposed and
enacted legislation validating "living wills" in 1984 and 1985. This recent surge
has increased the number of states which have enacted "living will" statutes to
thirty-five 3 plus the District of Columbia."
Statutory requirements
Statutes which recognize the "living will" as legally binding adopt the
same procedural requirements as those found in testamentary will provisions.5
These procedural requirements reduce the possibility of mistake or fraud. In
addition, the declarant is alerted to the fact that this is an important document
being signed.
Just as capacity' is essential to the making of a testimentary will, it is also
needed to execute a "living will." Capacity to execute a "living will" is depen-
dent upon the capacity to consent to treatment.47 A majority of the statutes
391d.
4Id.
41Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, 1976 Cal. Stat. 6478 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195
(West Supp. 1986).
'
2Dufraine, supra note 4, at 800. For a more detailed analysis of the states adoption of "living will" legisla-
tion, see Dufraine, at 800-05; SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 1981-84
(1984).
"See authorities cited supra note 10.
"D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1985).
"SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 1981-84 (1984). Arkansas' statute states
"[alny person, with the same formalities as are required by the laws of this state for the execution of a will,
may execute a document." ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3802 (Supp. 1985). Execution requires that the document
be signed, dated and witnessed. Two adult witnesses are required, and these witnesses may not be individuals
who have an interest in the declarant's estate, who might have a claim against the estate or who might be
able to exert undue influence on the document. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.401 to 403 (1971).
'4"Capacity has been defined to be a soundness of mind which renders the maker able to mentally under-
stand, in general terms, the nature and extent of his property and an understanding of the acts he is perform-
ing when he makes the will." Dufraine, supra note 4, at 805.
"Kutner, supra note i, at 552. "[a] person who is a minor, institutionalized, or adjudged incompetent could
not make such a declaration. A guardian should not be permitted to make such a declaration on behalf of his
ward nor a parent on behalf of his child." Id.
[Vol. 19:3
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enacted require that the declarant be of "sound mind.""8 Thus, the declarant
must be competent in order to have the capacity to sign a "living will."
One advantage to the "living will" is that it enables one to make a compe-
tent determination before becoming incapacitated. It gives a terminally ill pa-
tient an opportunity to refuse future treatment at a time when competency is
not in question, and at a time when the patient is not making an ultimate life
and death decision. 9 Some statutes have removed this advantage by requiring
the terminally ill patient to reexecutive the "living will" fourteen days after be-
ing informed of the terminal condition. 0 This renders a comatose patient and
other incompetents unable to effectively executive a living will.
All of the statutes contain a definition section which sets forth the condi-
tions for the document's use." The defined terms often create ambiguities.
These ambiguities create difficulties in interpreting and strictly adhering to the
legislation. The "ordinary" versus "extraordinary" treatment terms have been
the basis for much debate.52 Many statutes use the term "imminent" to define
the period in which a patient's death will occur. 3 These terms must be more
precisely defined to assure a more consistent interpretation of the statutes.
Courts' interpretation of these terms may defeat the purpose behind the legisla-
tion. The statutes are enacted to allow a terminally ill patient to forego or ter-
minate life-sustaining medical treatment without judicial intervention.
A provision stating the procedures to revoke or modify a "living will" is
found in every statute. Allowing the declarant to revoke or modify the "living
will" document grants the declarant some flexibility in her decision. The ex-
isting statutes generally provide for revocation by the execution of a subse-
quent instrument expressing an intent to revoke,"' or by a physical act or ver-
'See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3802 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7188 (West Supp.
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-321(c)(3) (1985).
"Note, supra note 36, at 514. Several factors can affect the competency of a patient in critical condition:
First, the patient's wishes may be affected by "what he thinks his relatives want, by the emotional
stress caused by the illness, by the doctor's attitude, by the relatives' attitudes, and even by financial
considerations." Second, psychological studies have indicated that all persons have a suppressed long-
ing for death - the death wish, or "thanos." Since that desire can manifest itself on a conscious level
when a person is seriously ill, the patient must be protected from this temporary manifestation. Third,
the patient may not know his true condition.
Id. at 513 (footnotes omitted).
"CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7188 (West Supp. 1986).
"See authorities cited supra note 10.
""A workable definition of the term 'ordinary' is any medical treatment which offers a reasonable hope of
recovery while 'extraordinary' is that treatment which does not offer a reasonable hope of recovery in the pa-
tient." Dufraine, supra note 4, at 786.
Ordinary means are 'all medicines, treatment and operations which offer a reasonable hope of benefit,
and which can be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience,' while
extraordinary means are 'those which do involve these factors, or which, if used, would not offer a
reasonable hope of benefit.'
Note, supra note 36, at 495.
"See Right to Die supra note 35, at 125.
"See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.06 (West Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.7 (West Supp. 1985).
COMMENTSWinter, 19861
7
Mazgaj: Ohio's Need to Enact a Living Will Statute
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
bal expression of the declarant, or an individual acting on his behalf, com-
municated to the attending physical.55 Many of the statutes permit revocation
without determining the mental state or competency of the declarant. This is
deemed necessary because "[olne of the greatest fears of a client about a "living
will" is the fear of an inability to change one's mind during terminal illness
simply because others consider him or her incompetent."56
In a majority of states, the "living will" is effective until revoked." Some
states require that the "living will" document be reexecuted every certain
number of years.5 8 There are advantages in having the declarant review, sign
and redate the document. 9 However, requiring that the declarant reexecute
the document may result in a "living will," which expresses the precise desires
of the terminally ill patient, being declared invalid. The declarant is thus
burdened with the responsibility of reexecuting the document regardless of
whether his attitude concerning life-sustaining medical treatment has re-
mained the same. Physicians, attorneys, and family members often retain
copies of the declarant's "living will." The declarant will be required to insure
that all individuals possess a current copy of the "living will."
Physicians and health care personnel perform the major role in carrying
out the directive of the terminally ill patient. Physicians are concerned with
possible liability arising from procedures involving a "living will." Actions
against physicians are often based on the lack of consent to treatment by the
patient. ° "The possible liability for continuing life prolonging treatment
without consent emphasizes the practical effect of the living will."61 Physicians
and health care professionals are granted both civil and criminal immunity
when they "in good faith" withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from
a terminally ill patient in accordance with the patient's "living will." 6'
However, physicians and health care professionals are not exempt from claims
of negligence. 63 "Living wills" are the method to "free physicians, in the pursuit
"See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7189(a) (West Supp. 1986).
"Living Will, supra note 4, at 704; Note, supra note 36, at 517.
17See, e.g., FLA. STAT, ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West Supp. 1985).
"IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4506 (1982) (five years); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.03(1) (West Supp. 1985) (Five years);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-6 (1985) (Seven years).
"RoSOFF, supra note 29, at 315.
'Dufraine, supra note 4, at 819.
"Id.
A physician who ignores the patient's refusal of consent may increase the damage award in a suc-
cessful suit against him by the patient's estate for prolonging the patient's suffering. When faced with
the choice of either increasing his potential liablity or following the instructions of the living will,
most reasonable physicians will probably follow the directive.
Id. at 820.
"Cohn, The Living Will From the Nurses Perspective, 11 L., MED. AND HEALTH CARE, 121 (1983).
"Comment, To Die or Not to Die: The New York Legislature Ponders a Natural Death Act, 13 FORDHAM
URn. L.J. 639, 671 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Natural Death Act]. Immunity is inapplicable "if it is shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the person authorizing or effectuating the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures was negligent or did not in good faith comply with the provisions of
this act." S.B. 2387, 201st. Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (New Jersey Nov. 19, 1984).
[Vol. 19:3
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of their healing vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or self-
protection concerns which would inhibit their independent medical judgment
for the well-being of their dying patients. 64
A majority of physicians do not consider it morally or legally wrong to
"withdraw extraordinary life-support systems in hopeless situations. 65 In
jurisdictions where "living wills" are given legal status, physicians are generally
required to either comply with the directive or tranfer the patient to another
physician.' A majority of states require the noncomplying physician to make a
"reasonable effort" to transfer the patient to another physician.67 Placing a
strict responsibility on the physician to transfer the patient may result in physi-
cians becoming apprehensive about accepting patients who have executed "liv-
ing wills" and a general uneasiness in the medical profession.
In some instances the existence of a "living will" statute may actually
have a chilling effect on doctors; they may hesitate to terminate treatment
where previously they would have done so in the exercise of their own
medical judgment and discretion. This is particularly true where a ter-
minal patient has not executed a directive. The doctor may assume that
the failure to execute a directive means that the patient does not want life-
sustaining procedures to be withdrawn or withheld, or that terminating
treatment in the absence of a directive signed by the patient could result
in legal liability."
Many statutes now provide that the failure of a patient to make a "living
mill" creates no presumption as to his wishes regarding the use, withholding or
liscontinuing of life-sustaining medical treatment.69 This provision enables the
)hysician to make a professional judgment based on his medical training, and
Aithout the worry of legal implications. The "chilling effect" may be of some
-oncern, but it does not outweigh the benefit of the "living will" to the medical
)rofession.
Placement and safekeeping of the "living will" is a concern. It is the pa-
ient's responsibility to make sure the proper parties are cognizant of his inten-
'In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1976).
'Dufraine, supra note 4, at 824. In making the decision to forego or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, the
,hysicians are balancing the "odds of survival, fears of malpractice law suits, family guilt, and their own per-
onal sense of ethics in determining the care of the dying." Natural Death Act, supra note 63 at 641.
'Physicians not complying with the directive who make arrangements to transfer the patient are not subject
o any type of sanctions by the statutes. Some authors believe that if the physician's cooperation is not en-
ured by the threat of sanctions, the effectiveness of the statute will be jeopardized. King, Living Will -
egislation in Illinois: What it Could Mean to Doctor and Patient, 72 ILL. B.J. 408, 412 (1984). "It has been
uggested that imposing sanctions may be counterproductive in situations calling for difficult professional
udgment, and may inhibit physicians in communicating frankly with the patient and family." Id. See also,
vlartyn, supra note 1i, at 794.
'Martyn, supra note 11, at 794. See VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:7 (Supp. 1983).
'Comment, The Right to Die: A Proposal for Natural Death Legislation, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 228, 240
1980).
'See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 ICC) (1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-19 (West 1985).
Winter, 19861 COMMENTS
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tions."° Some statutes require that the "living will" be placed in the patient's
medical file." Registering the document with the Bureau of Vital Statistics is
required in some jurisdictions. A maker of a "living will" should have ready
access to the document in the event a review of the document's contents is nec-
essary or revocation is desired. Friends and relatives should be notified of one's
execution of a "living will" and its contents. This will assure the patient that a
search for the document will be conducted if necessary. If the document is not
found, the notification of the friends and relatives can be rpesented as evidence
of the patient's intentions.
Major concerns with "living wills" are that they can not be executed by
incompetents," that there must be a declaration that the patient is terminally
ill and death is imminent,"' and that they only give directives pertaining to life-
sustaining treatment." "Living wills," no matter how broadly or specifically
worded, can not anticipate the full range of medical decisions.76 They can not
be used to appoint an agent or enunciate specific instructions regarding
medical care." When the patient is individually unable to refuse medical treat-
ment, the courts have permitted the patient's right to be exercised by another.
However, this procedure to have another exercise one's right to refuse treat-
ment can not be accomplished by a majority of "living will" statutes."
THE "DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY"
A "power of attorney" is a document by which one person (the principal)
confers upon another person (the agent) the legally recognized authority to
perform certain acts on the principal's behalf.8" The general "power of attor-
ney" becomes inoperative when the principal becomes incapacitated.81 All fifty
"
0Physicians should not be required to spend time ascertaining whether the patient has executed a living will.
Note, supra note 36, at 515.
7See, e.g., NEV. REV, STAT. §§ 449.610 (1977).
"See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 85-606 (West Supp. 1985).
"All statutes require the declarant of a "living will" to be competent. The law has recognized certain rights
of incompetents: (1) they are said to possess all the rights attributable to competent adults; (2) the law re-
quires them to be permitted to participate in decisions regarding their care and treatment to the greatest
possible extent; and (3) the right to have someone make the decision for them. Clarke, supra note 3, at 806.
"'Martyn, supra note 11, at 790.
"Id. at 787.
'Medical Treatment, supra note 14, at 999.
"Collin, Durable Powers of Attorney, 6 CAL. LAW. July 1, 1985, at 51.
"See, Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Superintendent of Belch-
ertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
"See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 (West Supp. 1985).
"PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND
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states have enacted "durable power of attorney"8 statutes which permits the
agent's authority to continue after the principal has become incapacitated. 3
Executing a durable power of attorney may be the procedure to make cer-
tain a patient's decision concerning medical treatment is respected., However,
a majority of the statutes do not explicitly provide that the agent can make
medical decisions for the principal." In the recent case of Saunders v. State86
the court was presented with the issue of whether a durable power of attorney
is applicable to medical treatment decisions and held, "the application of the
durable power to making health care decisions on behalf of principals has not
been widely used and is not completely certain."87 Permitting the agent to
make health care decisions for the principal in the absence of explicit statutory
language has not been uniformly supported by the courts.
A "durable power of attorney" is uncomplicated and inexpensive to
create. It can be specifically drafted to meet the needs of the principal. The
durable power of attorney can be revoked at any time by the principal.8 By
enunciating "specific and unambiguous delineated powers and guidelines," the
agent, the family, and the principal's wishes." In jurisdictions which do not
recognize the "living will" as legally effective, the durable power of attorney at
least assures the principal that an individual of his choice will be making the
medical treatment decisions.
Ohio's "durable power of attorney" statute" does not specifically autho-
rize the agent or "attorney-in-fact" 9' to make health care decisions on behalf of
the principal.92 No cases have been decided which address this issue. The
"A "Durable Power of Attorney" helps to facilitate the management of one's affairs without court interven-
tion in the event of one's incompetency. It can be an effective estate planning tool which could be an alter-
native to conservatorship or guardianship. Comment, Court Enforcement of a Durable Power of Attorney,
17 U.S.F.L. REV. 611, 612 (1983) (Durable Power of Attorney].
"Saunders v. State, - Misc. 2d -, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1985).
"Living Wills are not applicable when one suffers a disability which requires medical treatment but the pa-
tient is not terminally ill. Statistics have shown that at age twenty-two one is 7.5 times more likely to suffer a
disability of ninety days or more than he or she is to die. At age sixty-two, one is 4.5 times more likely to suf-
fer a ninety day disability than he or she is to die. Bos, The Durable Power of Attorney, 64 MICH. B.J. 690
[July 1985).
"See, e.g. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09 (Page 1984).
16 Misc. 2d -, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1985).
1d. at 516. Medical decisions may fall within the narrow category of exceptions to the general rule that one
may do through an agent whatever he is empowered to do in his own proper person. Medical Treatment,
Yupra note 14, at 1009.
"See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09 (Page 1984).
"Right to Terminate, supra note 9, at 12.
*OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09 (Page 1984).
"Attorney-in-fact is the term the Ohio Legislature has designated for the agent of the "durable power of at-
:orney."
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.09 (Page 1984) provides in relevant part: ... All acts done by the attorney-
n-fact pursuant to the instrument during any period of disability, incapacity or adjudged incompetency of
the principal shall have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind the principal or his heirs, de-
visees, and personal representatives as if the principal were competent and not disabled or incapacitated....
Winter, 19861 COM ME N TS
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statute's current language leaves the medical treatment decision subject to in-
terpretation and judicial review. This ambiguity may cause the courts in Ohio
to spend their limited time in addressing the issue. The Ohio legislature can
eliminate the ambiguity by enacting a statute which specifically provides that
an agent of a durable power of attorney can make medical treatment decisions
for the principal. This will give the principal additional assurance that their
medical treatment decisions will be acknowledged and carried out. Health care
professionals will have guidelines and procedures to follow when their patient
is the principal of a durable power of attorney.93 The durable power of attorney
can therefore be a very forceful method to assure one that his decisions con-
cerning medical treatment will be honored after he has become incapacitated.
When a durable power of attorney is used in addition to a "living will," it
provides a means by which the patient's personal affairs and decisions concern-
ing medical treatment can be monitored "subsequent to the development of in-
capacity and prior to death." Advantages of the joint use of the "living will"
and durable power of attorney are:
(1) they avoid the cumbersome difficulties involved in setting up revocable
living trusts; (2) they are more efficient than a general power of attorney-
living will combination; (3) they relieve the family of having to resort to a
public determination of the rights of an individual in court; and (4) they
provide an inexpensive and flexible planning alternative of a guardian or
conservator.9"
If a court must determine whether an agent of a durable power of attorney
acted in accordance with the desires or best interests of the principal, a "living
will" could provide a "more complete expression of the principal's desires.
96
The "proxy appointment" is another method whereby a terminally ill pa-
tient's decision concerning life-sustaining treatment can be honored. A proxy
appointment allows a patient to appoint an agent to make health care decisions
on the patient's behalf.97 The proxy appointment is closely analagous to the
durable power of attorney. Five of the recent "living will" statutes contain a
proxy appointment provision.9" An agent can extend the scope of a patient's
3Ohio should adopt legislation like the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Decisions Act in Califor-
nia. This act grants immunity from civil and criminal liability as well as from "professional censure" for
health care professionals who act on the basis of a good faith belief that the attorney-in-fact is authorized by
the statute to make health care decisions. Uniform Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Decisions
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2400 (West 1983). The health care provider must believe, in good faith, that the deci-
sion is not inconsistent with the principal's wishes, and, if the decision is to withhold or withdraw health care
necessary to keep the principal alive, the provider must make a "good faith" effort to determine the desires of
the principal. Id.
"Death with Dignity, supra note 36, at 205.
"Id. at 204-05.
"Martyn, supra note 11, at 797.
"TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 80, at 146-47.
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2502(b)-(c) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.05(2) (West Supp. 1985); LA. REV.
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"self-determination" further than a written directive by making decisions con-
sistent with the patient's desires in situations which may not have been fore-
seen.99 The agent can conduct the decision-making process in much the same
manner as the patient.10° "Where the patient himself has actually designated
someone to represent him, there is greater assurance that the personal values
that will come into play in making the medical decision will be those of the pa-
tient." 01
Proxy appointments and durable powers of attorney are not risk-free 02
and the potential risk may outweigh the advantages. There is the possibility
that an agent will make an irrational decision. 3 Physicians may prematurely
classify a patient as incompetent in order to receive consent from the agent to
perform certain medical procedures.' Appointing an agent who does not act
in accordance with the patient's wishes is the paramount risk. A patient should
therefore select the agent only after careful thought and deliberation, since the
proxy appointment and durable power of attorney give great power to the
agent.
Do Not Resuscitate'05 (DNR) or "No Code"' orders permit a patient to
refuse life-sustaining treatment in a limited situation. For example, these pro-
cedures will permit a patient not to be resuscitated 0 ' in the event of cardiac
failure. A full discussion of the medical and legal ramifications of "DNR" and
"No Code" orders is beyond the scope of this article.''
JURISDICTIONS WITHOUT LIVING WILL LEGISLATION
Living wills can be advantageous in jurisdictions such as Ohio which do
"Medical Treatment, supra note 14, at 1001.
10ld. "An agent could ask questions, assess risks and costs, speak to friends and relatives of the patient, con-
sider a variety of therapeutic options, seek the opinions of other physicians and evaluate the patient's condi-
tion and prospects for recovery." Id.
'Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine. Striking a Balance Between Competing
Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 480.
0I2Medical Treatment, supra note 14, at 1005; TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 80, at 147-53.
101d.
"'Id. at 1006.
" Orders not to resuscitate are orders issued in anticipation of inevitable death, instructing the hospital staff
that in the event of cardiac or respiratory failure, "aggressive medical care" is to be withheld. Comment,
Medico-Legal Implications of "Orders Not to Resuscitate, "31 CATH. U.L. REV. 515 (1982).
""'No-Code Order" occurs when "the attending physician directs the nursing staff, by rotation in the pa-
tient's medical records, that in the event of cardiac arrest, the hospital's CPR team should not be
summoned." Allan, No Code Orders v. Resuscitation: The Decision to Withhold Lifeprolonging Treatment
From the Terminally III, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 139, 143 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Allan).
""'Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is a standard hospital procedure in which trained personnel promptly re-
spond to emergency codes and attempt to restore circulation and breathing in a cardiac arrest victim with
the use of defibrillators, electrical shock, chest compressors, translaryngeal intubation, and cardiac
massage." Allan, supra note 106, at 141. See also, TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 80, at 231.
"'For a more detailed analysis, See, Allan, supra note 106; Medico-Legal Implications, supra note 105; Presi-
dent's Commission, supra note 79, at 238-53; Comment, A Structural Analysis of the Physician-Patient
Relationship in No-Code Decisionmaking, 93 YALE L.J. 362 (1983); Comment, Physician Liability for
Failure to Resuscitate Terminally Ill Patients, 15 IND. L. REV. 905 (1982).
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not have a statute recognizing living wills as legally valid. They constitute a re-
quest, directed to family and physicians, to honor the directions of the
declarant as to the form and extent of medical treatment when the declarant is
no longer able to do so.109 "The living will may be morally persusasive to the pa-
tient's family members who experience guilt feelings when confronted with the
decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment.""1 ' The "living
will" is documented evidence written by the patient when competent. This
strong indicator should assure the family members that they are only express-
ing the views of the patient. The directive may also indirectly affect the family
if a life insurance company refuses to pay upon the insured's death."'
Physicians and hospitals can be affected by a "living will" in a jurisdiction
where the documents are not recognized as legally valid. Physicians and
hospitals are particularly cautious when determining whether to withdraw or
withhold life sustaining treatment from a terminally ill patient."2 Civil liability
or criminal prosecution against physicians and hospitals for following a "living
will" directive is remote."3 There is some authority permitting health care pro-
fessionals to follow the instructions of a "living will" without judicial interven-
tion and absent legislation. In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v.
Bludworth,"' a terminally ill patient stopped breathing and was placed on a
mechanical ventilator."5 The patient's wife gave the physicians a document en-
titled "Mercy Will and Last Testament" which was signed by the patient and
two witnesses." 6 The document stated that the patient did not wish to be kept
alive through the use of extraordinary life equipment such as a respirator."7 A
petition was filed requesting the life-sustaining treatment be terminated.' 8 In
determining whether the document could be considered in making the decision
to withdraw the life-sustaining treatment from a terminally ill and incompe-
tent patient, the court held, "If such a person, while competent, had executed a
so-called 'living' or 'mercy' will, that will would be persuasive evidence of that
incompetent person's intention and it should be given great weight by the per-
"'Right to Terminate, supra note 9, at 9.
"'Right to Die, supra note 35, at 126. Executing the living will may act to ease the strain on a patient's fami-
ly who might otherwise hesitate to suggest withdrawing treatment because of guilt feelings. Living Will,
supra note 4, at 669. See also, Deaith with Dignity. supra note 36, at 167.
"'Living Will, supra note 4, at 669; Death with Dignity, supra note 36, at 167. (Some insurance companies
make no remuneration for intentional death, regardless of the patient's terminal condition.)
"'Right to Die, supra note 35, at 126.
"
3Dufraine, supra note 4, at 820, 822. No physician has even been convicted of euthanasia. Id. Many com-
mentators believe that "any fear of incurring legal liability for acquiescing to a living will is unwarranted and
the likelihood of actual suit is practically nonexistent." Living Will, supra note 4, at 670.
114452 S.2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
"'Id. at 922. When placed on the ventilator, the patient was suffering from acute respiratory failure, chronic
interstitial fibrosis and gastrointestinal bleeding. The patient could not be weaned from the respirator and his






Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/5
son or persons who substitute their judgment on behalf of the terminally ill in-
competent."" 9 The court went on to hold that judicial intervention is not
always required 20
Where a comatose and terminally ill individual has executed a "living" or
"mercy" will, it is not necessary that a court-appointed guardian of his
person obtain approval of a court of competent jurisdiction before ter-
minating extraordinary life support systems in order for the consenting
family members, attending physicians, and hospital and its administrators
to be relieved of civil and criminal liablity; such parties need only act in
good faith.'
In Saunders v. State, 22 a declarant 23 of a living will petitioned the court to
determine the validity of the "living will" in New York. 2 The declarant
wanted the "living will" to be operative without further court determination, if
the events stated in the document occur. 125 The declarant further argued that it
was the exclusive function of the legislature to declare the "living will" valid. 26
The court did find the "living will" executed by the declarant to be in the
nature of an "informed medical consent statement."' 27 No civil or criminal
liability would attach to the physicians or hospitals if they act in good faith. 21
In addition, the court followed a line of cases 29 in finding the living will to be
very persuasive evidence of the patient's intent.30 Living wills executed in
"'Id. at 926.
1201d.
'id at 922. For the physicians, hospitals or family members to be civilly or criminally liable, there must be
a showing that their actions were not in good faith but were intended to harm the patient. Id. at 926. The
court expressed its willingness to always hear these matters if requested by the family. Id. In In re Peterson,
No. El 17,982, slip op. (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 1983), the court based its decision to remove life support
systems from a comatose patient on a living will and the fact that all family members with standing sup-
ported the decision to terminate treatment. Id. at 3.
"'_ Misc. 2d __, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 11985).
"'The declarant, Selma Saunders, was seventy years of age and suffered from both emphysema and lung
cancer. She had oxygen administered to her almost continually. Mrs. Saunders' condition was described as
being progressive and without current known medical care.





'John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361-62, 486
A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985) (Whether or not they are legally binding, living wills are relevant evidence of a pa-
tient's intent.) In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, J9, 355 A.2d 647, 698 (1976). (If Karen had executed a document
indicating her intent, then removal from the life-support system would be ordered.) Eichner v. Dillon, 73
A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 0. Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d
809 (1980).
'"Saunders, - Misc. 2d at __, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
The document executed by the petitioner is evidence of the most persuasive quality and is a clear and
convincing demonstration that while competent the petitioner clearly and explicitly expressed an in-
formed, rational and knowing decision to decline certain medical treatment by artificial means and
devices while in a terminally ill state or condition and it should be given great weight by the hospital
COMMENTSWinter, 19861
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jurisdictions which do not recognize the document as legally valid can
therefore remain advantageous to a limited extent.
OHIO'S PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A "living will" statute was introduced into the Ohio Legislature early in
1985.11 The bill proposed to enact sections 2108.31-.41 of the Ohio Revised
Code.132 A definition of terms provision is contained in the statute. "3 "Non-
communicative"' 1 and "terminal condition" '135 are two terms which are subject
to interpretation. Two physicians must, in writing, be of the judgment that the
patient's condition will result in "imminent death,"' 6 or that the patient is un-
conscious with a "negligible possibility"'37 of ever regaining consciousness. The
statute uses the term "medical measures" ' instead of making the ordinary-
extraordinary medical treatment distinction. All of these terms create am-
biguities and may require the courts to develop more specific definitions.
The statute permits an oral directive by a "communicative"' 3 9 patient to
be made to a nurse' 40 or physician. 41 Physicians are under a duty to be sure the
directive is entered into the patient's medical record. 42 The physician may re-
quire that an oral directive be reduced to writing. 43 This practice should be uti-
lized by physicians to indicate that they acted pursuant to the patient's instruc-
tions.
authorities and treating physicians attending her.ld.
31H.B. 220, 116th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1985-86). H.B. 220 was introduced on February 8, 1985.
'
321d. at § 1.
0id. at § 2108.31.
1
41Id at § 2108.31(N) "'Noncommunicative' means that a person is not able to make, convey to others, or
comprehend the import of his decisions regarding his medical treatment. A person's rejection of medical
measures or the fact that he is in severe pain does not in itself indicate that the person is
noncommunicative." Id.
"'Id. at § 2108.31(P).
"Terminal Condition means an illness, injury, or disease that, in the written judgment of a person's at-
tending physician and at least one other physician who personally have examined the person, meets
either of the following criteria:
(1) There is a virtual certainty that the condition will result in the imminent death of the person
regardless of what medical measures are used;
(2) The condition has associated with it a state of unconsciousness and there is a negligible
possibility of the person's ever regaining consciousness.
Id.
36Id. at § 2108.31(P)(1).
"1Id. at § 2108.31(P)(2).
" 
8 d. at 2108.3 1(L). "Medical Measures means any medicines, procedures, or devices a physician prescribes,
administers, performs, or authorizes." Id.
"'id. at § 2108.3 1(C). "Communicative means that a person is able to make and to convey to others his deci-
sions regarding his medical treatment and is able to comprehend the import of those decisions." Id.
11Id. at § 2108.32. If the adult attempts to give a directive to a nurse, the nurse shall with reasonable
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Only life-sustaining medical treatment for terminally ill patients is ad-
dressed by the proposed legislation. This is in accord with most "living will"
statutes, but it is considered by many to be a drawback since a majority of
medical decisions are not addressed. The legality of a clause instructing the
physician to administer pain-relieving drugs to the patient, even though such
an action may hasten the moment of death, is not addressed.'" A majority of
states do not have such a provision since many consider the administration of
such drugs to be the equivalent of condoning or permitting euthanasia. 5
The proposed legislation permits a "communicative" adult to execute a
living will, which must be signed by two witnesses.'" The legislation does not
establish qualifications for the witnesses. The statute should be amended to
disallow family members, individuals who may have an interest or claim
against the patient's estate, or the physician and medical personnel from acting
as witnesses. This will reduce the possibility or appearance of improper in-
fluences. Living wills executed prior to the statute's enactment will be
recognized as legally valid.4 7 This will avoid the needless task of having all
declarants re-execute their "living wills."
Execution of a subsequent "living will" constitutes a revocation of the pre-
vious document."' Giving a directive conflicting with the terms of the "living
will" will also be construed as a revocation.'49 This provision allows the "living
will" to be revoked orally. While an oral revocation may create litigation, it
more fully protects the patient who can not obtain or prepare a written direc-
tive.
A general consent to treatment is superseded by the "living will."'5° Fail-
ing to execute a "living will" does not create a presumption as to whether treat-
ment is desired.'' Thus, one who has not executed a living will does not have
his or her right to refuse treatment subjected to a different standard. The pro-
posed legislation does not require the "living will" to be reexecuted every cer-
tain number of years or reexecuted a certain number of days after the patient is
declared terminally ill. This benefits the terminally ill and unconscious patient
who has previously executed a "living will" while competent.
The proposed legislation grants medical personnel immunity from civil or
criminal liability.' One provision of the statute which may be the subject of
'"See Note, supra note 36, at 519.
1451d
"
1'"H.B. 220, 116th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. § 2108.33 (1985-1986).
147Id
"'Id. at 2108.34(A).
1'4Id. at § 2108.34(B).
"Id. at § 2108.35.
11id. "The failure of a person to make a directive or living will creates no presumption as to his wishes re-
garding the use, withholding, or discontinuing of medical measures when he is terminal." Id.
'id. at § 2108.36.
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debate and criticism states "Injothing in Sections 2108.31 to 2108.41 of the Re-
vised Code shall be construed to grant immunity for withholding or discontin-
uing comfort care unless a 'living will' or directive expressly instructs against
the use of specific kinds of comfort care."' 53 One might conclude from cursory
reading of this provision that certain life-sustaining procedures, such as a
respirator, can only be discontinued if it is so specifically stated in the directive.
This provision attempts to require some specificity in the directives, and pre-
vent the use of a general "blanket clause." Although a general "blanket clause"
should not be effective, requiring the inclusion of the specific treatment may
create an unreasonable burden. Protecting the patient's decision is a concern of
the state, but this clause may have taken the concern beyond reasonableness.
The statute does not subject medical personnel to civil or criminal liability
for withholding or discontinuing medical measures from a terminally ill patient
who has not executed a "living will," if consent is obtained from specified fami-
ly members or a court order is obtained. 5' This provision creates the assump-
tion that the immediate family is best suited to make the treatment decision. A
family member not agreeing to the treatment decision can petition the probate
court for an order.' 55
Mercy killing is not condoned by the statute. "6 It is not suicide to
withdraw or withhold the treatment."7 Criminal sanctions are imposed against
any person who foregoes or willfully and falsely attests to the making of a liv-
ing will. 5 These provisions are found in all of the "living will" statutes and can
be considered "boiler plate" provisions.
CONCLUSION
Today's technology can extend the life of a terminally ill patient in-
definitely. Terminally ill patients must be given the right to determine how the
processes of death will occur. A majority of states have granted the terminally
ill patient that right. Ohio should join the majority and recognize the "dignity
of dying."
The "living will" is the most effective method in deciding whether a ter-
minally ill patient wants to forego or terminate life-sustaining medical treat-
ment. Legislation is needed in all states to declare the "living will" a legally
valid document. Ohio is now contemplating enacting a "living will" statute.




1"ld. at § 2108.38.
"Id. at § 2108.38(B).
116Id. at § 2108.40(B).
111Id. at § 2108.40(A).
1o1d. at § 2108.41. Whoever violates the statute is guilty of a felony of the fourth degree.
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